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Abstract
This paper analyses Bayesian persuasion of a privately informed
receiver in a linear framework. The sender is restricted to censorship,
that is, to strategies in which each state is either perfectly revealed
or hidden. I develop a new approach to ﬁnding optimal censorship
strategies based on direct optimisation. I also show how this approach
can be used to restrict the set of optimal censorship schemes, and to
analyse optimal censorship under certain classes of distributions of the
receiver's type.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyses a Bayesian persuasion game between a sender and a
privately informed receiver. Both the sender and the receiver have linear
utility functions. There is a continuum of states. The sender wants the
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receiver to act; the receiver only wants to act if his type is lower than the
state.
The paper diﬀers from the existing literature in two respects: it focuses on
a particular class of persuasion strategies; and it develops a novel approach
to ﬁnding the optimal strategy.
Speciﬁcally, the paper analyses a model in which the sender is restricted
to censorship strategies: every state of the world is either revealed perfectly,
or not revealed at all. In other words, the sender pools some states into a
single set, and for each of the other states she sends a unique message.
A restriction to censorship strategies is relevant to a number of situations
in which the sender needs to choose whether to transmit information that
originates from an exogenous source. Consider, for example, a ﬁrm that
wants to persuade customers to buy its product. A customer's willingness
to do so depends on his preference type, as well as on a state of the world,
which reﬂects the product's quality. The ﬁrm cannot credibly commit to
an experiment that maps states to messages. It can, however, submit its
product for review by independent experts. Some reviewers tend to detect
and report very high quality; others  very low quality, etc. By choosing a
set of reviewers, the ﬁrm can choose which states are revealed.
As another example, consider an authoritarian government that seeks to
maximise the number of citizens that take a certain action (such as vot-
ing for the government, joining a pro-government rally, or refusing to join
an anti-government protest). A citizen's willingness to do so depends on
her type (which measures the degree to which she supports the government's
ideology), and on the news (which is a measure of how competent the govern-
ment is)1. The government can restrict the set of available news by choosing
which independent media outlets are allowed to operate in the country2.
The key contribution of this paper is in developing a novel approach to
ﬁnding the optimal censorship scheme when the sender is constrained to
censorship strategies. Speciﬁcally, the paper takes a direct optimisation ap-
proach: for a given censorship strategy it checks whether proﬁtable deviations
1Thus, the citizen wants to support the government when his belief in the government's
competence outweighs his dislike of the government's ideology. This is in line with models
of expressive voting (Brennan and Hamlin, 1998), in which voters, irrespective of the
outcome of the vote, derive intrinsic utility from voting for an alternative that is correct
from their point of view.
2See the working paper version of Kolotilin et al. (2017) for an application of Bayesian
persuasion to government censorship of the media.
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exist.
Intuitively, because the sender is restricted to either revealing the state
perfectly or censoring it, her persuasion strategy is fully described by a set
S of states that are censored. For that set to be optimal, the sender must be
unwilling to reveal any state that belongs to S, or to censor any state that
does not belong to S.3 The change in the sender's expected payoﬀ result-
ing from such deviations is driven by two factors. First, whether a state is
censored or not aﬀects the sender's expected payoﬀ when Nature draws that
state. This happens because if the state is revealed, the receiver acts if and
only if his type is below the state; while if it is censored, the receiver acts if
and only if his type is below the expected value of the state conditional on
it being in S. Second, whether or not a state is censored changes the afore-
mentioned expectation, and hence aﬀects the sender's payoﬀ in the event any
state is censored. The magnitude of these two eﬀects depends on the shape
of the distribution of the receiver's type  hence, that distribution aﬀects
the optimal censorship strategy. This logic underlies Proposition 1, which
establishes a necessary condition for a censorship strategy to be optimal.
While this condition is only necessary and not suﬃcient, it substantially
reduces the set of potentially optimal strategies. The rest of the paper shows
that this result is suﬃciently powerful to gain several new insights.
First, I demonstrate how Proposition 1 can be used to restrict the set
of optimal strategies. In general, S can be complex, consisting of many
disjoint intervals. However, Proposition 2 shows that at the optimum, this
complexity of S is bounded by the number of peaks of the density of the
receiver's type.
Second, I analyse the simple case when the density of the receiver's type
is single-peaked. In this case, censorship is known to be an unconstrained
optimal persuasion strategy4. The result of Proposition 1 can then be used
to describe the eﬀect of a suﬃciently large shift in the location of the peak,
and in the distribution of the state. Speciﬁcally, Propositions 3 and 4 show
that the sender censors more states when the peak decreases, or when the
expected state increases.
Third, I examine the case when the density of type is bimodal. In that
case, censorship is not, in general, an optimal strategy5. But what if the
3More precisely, the paper analyses marginal changes in the sender's payoﬀ that occur
if she reveals or censors an inﬁnitesimally small interval of states.
4See Alonso and Câmara (2016b) and Kolotilin (2018).
5See Proposition 3 in Kolotilin (2018).
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sender is restricted to censorship strategies? In Propositions 5 and 6, I char-
acterise optimal censorship policies for diﬀerent classes of bimodal distri-
butions. Speciﬁcally, I show that depending on the shape of the bimodal
density, the sender either censors intermediate states while revealing high
and low states, or reveals intermediate states while censoring high and/or
low states.
This paper belongs to the growing literature on Bayesian persuasion with
linear utilities (see, for example, Gentzkow and Kamenica, 2016; Kolotilin
and Zapechelnyuk, 2019; Kolotilin and Li, 2019; Dworczak and Martini,
forthcoming). In particular, Kolotilin et al. (2017) and Kolotilin (2018) ana-
lyse linear persuasion in a setting in which, as in this paper, the receiver has
private information. Alonso and Câmara (2016b) also study the case when
the receiver is privately informed. More generally, a number of papers have
studied Bayesian persuasion of a group of heterogeneous receivers6. My pa-
per diﬀers from the rest of the literature by focusing on censorship strategies,
and using an optimisation approach that checks for the existence of proﬁtable
deviations7.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the
model. Section 3 derives the direct optimisation approach to ﬁnding the
optimal censorship policy. Section 4 shows how that approach can be used
to gain new insights about optimal censorship. Section 5 concludes. All
proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Model
A sender (she) is facing a receiver (he). The receiver has a type t ∈ [0, 1].
The type is drawn from a distribution G with a continuously diﬀerentiable
density g. There is a state of the world ω ∈ [0, 1], drawn by Nature from a
smooth distribution F with a strictly positive density f .
The receiver can choose action a ∈ {0, 1}. I will say that the receiver
acts if he chooses action 1. The sender's payoﬀ equals a  thus, the sender
6See Taneva (2018). In addition, Alonso and Câmara (2016a), Wang (2013), Bardhi
and Guo (2018), and Chan et al. (2018) study Bayesian persuasion of a heterogeneous
group of voters.
7In contrast, Kolotilin (2018) as well as Dworczak and Martini (forthcoming) use du-
ality approach, while Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016), Alonso and Câmara (2016b), and
Kolotilin et al. (2017) use concaviﬁcation.
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aims to maximise the probability that the receiver acts. If the receiver does
not act, his payoﬀ equals 0. If he acts, his payoﬀ equals ω − t. Thus, the
receiver wants to act if and only if his type is lower than the state.
At the beginning of the game, Nature draws t from G; the receiver is
informed about t. Next, the sender selects a set of states S ⊆ [0, 1] that are
censored, i.e. not revealed to the receiver. I will refer to S as the sender's
censorship strategy. For tractability, I will assume that S has a ﬁnite number
of boundary points. Furthermore, I will assume that every boundary point
of S is either an upper or a lower boundary point8, but not both  this means
that S does not contain any unattached points9. Thus, either S = ∅, or
S =
n⋃
i=1
[pi, qi] such that 0 ≤ pi < qi < pi+1 ≤ 1,∀i = 1, .., n for some integer
n. After the sender has chosen S, Nature draws the state ω from F . Next,
if ω /∈ S, the receiver learns it; otherwise, he updates his beliefs. He then
chooses action a ∈ {0, 1}. Finally, payoﬀs are realised.
3 Optimisation Approach
This section will derive the optimisation approach to ﬁnding the optimal
censorship strategy.
Suppose the sender has chosen some S. Then if ω /∈ S, the receiver learns
the state. He then acts if t < ω, and does not act if t > ω. The sender's
expected payoﬀ thus equals G (ω). If S is nonempty and ω ∈ S, the receiver's
payoﬀ from acting equals EF [ω − t | ω ∈ S]. Thus, the receiver acts if and
only if t < tS, where tS ≡ EF [ω | ω ∈ S]. The sender's expected payoﬀ then
equals G (tS).
Given S, let v (S) be the sender's expected payoﬀ. It then equals
v (S) =
∫
ω/∈S
G (ω) dF (ω) + µSG (tS)
8Formally, state w is a lower boundary point of S if there exists some ε > 0 such that
all ω ∈ (w − ε, w) are outside S and all ω ∈ (w,w + ε) belong to S. A state w is an upper
boundary point of S if there exists some ε > 0 such that all ω ∈ (w − ε, w) belong to S
and all ω ∈ (w,w + ε) are outside S.
9This assumption is without loss of generality, because if there were such points, their
total mass would be zero (as the number of boundary points of S is assumed to be ﬁnite), so
a censorship strategy that contains such points is payoﬀ-equivalent to another censorship
strategy that does not contain them.
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where µS ≡
∫
ω∈S dF (ω) is the probability that the state falls in S.
10
The sender chooses S to maximise v (S). We can consider the following
deviations: ﬁrst, the sender may deviate to censoring a small interval of states
around some ω /∈ S; second, she can deviate to revealing a small interval of
states around some ω ∈ S. If S is optimal, the sender must not gain from
such deviations. In particular, the change in her payoﬀ from the deviation
should be negative as the width of the interval converges to zero.
This logic underlies the key result of the paper: a necessary condition
for S to constitute an optimal censorship strategy. It is summarised in the
following proposition:
Proposition 1. Suppose that S maximises v (·). Then
• zS (ω) ≥ 0 for any ω ∈ S; and
• zS (ω) ≤ 0 for any ω /∈ S,
where zS (ω) ≡ G (tS)−G (ω) + (ω − tS) g (tS).
To see the intuition, consider a state ω /∈ S. Suppose the sender deviates
to censoring ω (that is, pools it with S). This will have two eﬀects on her
payoﬀ. First, whenever ω is drawn, the sender will now receive G (tS) instead
of G (ω). Second, pooling ω with S will move tS towards ω, which will change
the sender's payoﬀ every time a state is censored. The magnitude of the shift
in tS is proportional to the distance between ω and tS, while the marginal
eﬀect of shifting tS on the sender's payoﬀ equals g (tS), i.e. the slope of G
at tS. Hence, the marginal change in the sender's payoﬀ from censoring ω
instead of revealing it is proportional to
G (tS)−G (ω) + (ω − tS) g (tS) = zS (ω)
If the initially chosen S is optimal, this must be weakly negative. By similar
logic, zS (ω) must be weakly positive at any ω ∈ S.
Since zS (ω) is continuous, Proposition 1 implies that at the equilibrium,
any boundary point of S must be a state ω at which zS (ω) = 0, that is, at
which g (tS) =
G(ω)−G(tS)
ω−tS .
11 Since g (tS) is the slope of G at tS, any boundary
10Technically, tS is only deﬁned when S is nonempty. If S = ∅, then v (S) =∫ 1
0
G (ω) dF (ω).
11Technically, the condition g (tS) =
G(ω)−G(tS)
ω−tS is only deﬁned for ω 6= tS . It is also
possible for tS to be at the boundary of S.
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Figure 1: Optimal censorship. Here, S = [0, q1] ∪ [p2, q2].
point of S must be a point at which a line that is tangent to G at tS intersects
G. At a given state ω, if G is below (above) that tangent line, then g (tS) is
greater (smaller) than G(ω)−G(tS)
ω−tS , and hence ω is censored (revealed). Figure
1 illustrates this result.
Proposition 1 provides a necessary condition for a censorship strategy to
be optimal. The condition links the existence of proﬁtable deviations from
S to the shape of G. Note that this condition is not suﬃcient  it may still
be optimal for the sender to deviate at a positive-measure subset of states.
Nevertheless, this result can be used to analyse optimal censorship strategies.
This is shown in the next section.
4 Optimal Censorship Strategies
This section will show how the optimisation approach derived previously can
be used to derive optimal censorship strategies for various distributions of
the receiver's type. I will start by showing how Proposition 1 can be used to
restrict the set of optimal censorship strategies for a generic G. Then I will
show how it can be applied to characterising optimal censorship strategies
when G is unimodal or bimodal.
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For the subsequent analysis, the following result12 will be useful:
Lemma 1. S = ∅ is optimal if and only if G is convex.
Hence, full revelation is optimal if and only if g is increasing on [0, 1].
4.1 General distributions
Consider any distribution G. What can we say about the optimal censorship
strategy? As described in the model, the set S of censored states is either
S = ∅, or S =
n⋃
i=1
[pi, qi]. Hence, S can include any ﬁnite number n of
disjoint intervals. That n can be large  that is, the censorship strategy can
be complex. The next result will show, however, that the complexity of S
is bounded by the complexity of the density of the receiver's type.
Referring to Figure 1, Proposition 1 implies that G must be ﬂatter than
g (tS) at each interior pi, and steeper than g (tS) at each interior qi. Hence,
for all interior boundary points pi and qi, G needs to be convex on some
interval within [pi, qi], and concave on some interval within [qi, pi+1]. Thus,
for optimal S to include many disjoint intervals [pi, qi], G must contain a
suﬃciently large number of alternating convex and concave sections. A point
at which G changes from being convex to being concave is a local maximum
of g. Hence, for n to be large, g must have a large number of local maxima.
This intuition underlies the following result:
Proposition 2. If g has m < ∞ local weak maxima, then S =
n⋃
i=1
[pi, qi]
with n ≤ m+ 1.
Hence, the optimal S cannot consist of more disjoint intervals than the
number of peaks of g plus 1. Relatively simple distributions of the receiver's
types induce relatively simple censorship strategies.
Note that S is fully characterised by a vector of its n upper boundary
points and n lower boundary points. Proposition 2 then implies that the
optimal censorship strategy is a result of a 2 (m+ 1)-variable optimisation
problem. This result can be compared to Theorem 2 in Kolotilin et al. (2017),
which (in the case when the sender is not restricted to censorship strategies)
12Kolotilin (2018) shows a similar result when the sender is not restricted to censorship
strategies.
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shows that the sender's choice of an optimal receiver's interim utility is (in
the case when the sender is only interested in the receiver's action) a result
of an m-variable optimisation problem.
4.2 Unimodal distributions
Suppose that g has a unique peak k. In that case, Kolotilin et al. (2017)
and Kolotilin (2018) show that censorship is the optimal persuasion strategy
when the sender is not restricted to censorship strategies. Speciﬁcally, the
sender chooses upper-censorship (pooling together all states above a certain
cutoﬀ, and perfectly revealing all other states). Of course, upper-censorship
is also optimal in my setup; the following lemma derives the result from
Kolotilin et al. (2017) and Kolotilin (2018) using the approach developed in
Section 3:
Lemma 2. Suppose G is convex on (0, k) and concave on (k, 1) for some
k ∈ (0, 1). Then there exists a unique optimal censorship strategy S = [p, 1],
such that 0 ≤ p < k, and k < t[p,1] < 1.
The lower boundary of S is a point p at which z[p,1] (p) = 0. If p > 0,
then Proposition 1 implies that p is given by the condition z[p,1] (p) = 0.
Graphically, p it is the point at which the line that is tangent to G at tS
intersects G. It is also possible for the tangent line never to intersect G.
This happens when z[0,1] (0) ≥ 0. In that case, we have a corner solution in
which p = 0, and S = [0, 1].
Since Proposition 1 describes the necessary condition for S to be optimal
based on the curvature of G, Lemma 2 ensures that at the optimum, p <
k < tS. Hence, the optimisation approach of this paper implies that a change
in G that shifts k, or a change in F that shifts tS, induce a change of the
optimal censorship strategy if the shift is suﬃciently large.
In particular, if k moves far enough that it ends up below p or above tS,
the optimal S has to change as well, as the following result shows:
Proposition 3. Take a unimodal distribution G with mode k that induces
a censorship policy S = [p, 1]. Take another distribution Gˆ with mode kˆ. If
kˆ > tS, then Gˆ induces a censorship policy Sˆ such that Sˆ ⊂ S. If kˆ < p, then
Gˆ induces a censorship policy Sˆ such that S ⊂ Sˆ.
Hence, the sender censors more (less) states if the modal receiver becomes
more (less) willing to act.
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Similarly, suppose that F is replaced by another distribution Fˆ that puts
a larger mass of states to the left. If the shift in F is suﬃciently strong, it
aﬀects the optimal censorship strategy, as the following result shows.
Proposition 4. Take a unimodal distribution G with mode k. Consider a
distribution of states F , which induces a censorship policy S = [p, 1]. Take
another distribution Fˆ . If EFˆ [ω | ω > p] < k, then Fˆ induces a censorship
policy Sˆ ⊂ S.
Hence, when the state tends to be worse (better) from the sender's point
of view, the optimal censorship strategy is less (more) restrictive.
4.3 Bimodal distributions
Suppose that G is bimodal. We can look at two classes of bimodal distribu-
tions.
First, suppose that for some k, k such that k < k, g is increasing on (0, k),
decreasing on
(
k, k
)
, and increasing on
(
k, 1
)
. Then we have the following
result:
Proposition 5. Suppose G is convex on (0, k), concave on
(
k, k
)
, and convex
on
(
k, 1
)
for some k, k such that 0 < k < k < 1. Then the optimal censorship
strategy is S = [p, q], where 0 ≤ p < q ≤ 1 and k < t[p,q] < k.
In words, the sender censors states over some intermediate interval [p, q] ⊆
[0, 1]. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
Intuitively, if tS ≤ k, then for all ω < tS, G (ω) lies above the line
that is tangent to it at tS. Then by Proposition 1 all of these states have
to be revealed, which is impossible, since tS ≡ EF [ω | ω ∈ S]. By similar
reasoning, we cannot have tS ≥ k. Hence, at the optimum, tS ∈
(
k, k
)
. The
boundaries p and q of S are then the points at which the tangent line crosses
G. Depending on the shapes of F and G, it is possible that the tangent line
only crosses G once, or never  in that case, p = 0 and/or q = 1.
Next, consider a diﬀerent class of bimodal distributions. Suppose that
for some k, k such that k < k, g is decreasing on (0, k), increasing on
(
k, k
)
,
and decreasing on
(
k, 1
)
. For these distributions, Kolotilin (2018) shows that
the optimal persuasion strategy is interval revelation: the sender sends one
message for all states that are suﬃciently low, another message for all states
that are suﬃciently high, and perfectly reveals all intermediate states.
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G(t)
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Figure 2: Optimal censorship under bimodal (convex-concave-convex) G.
That strategy, however, is not a censorship strategy. What if the sender
is restricted to censorship strategies  that is, if she has to send the same
message for all states that are not perfectly revealed? The next result char-
acterises such a constrained optimal persuasion strategy.
Proposition 6. Suppose G is concave on (0, k), convex on
(
k, k
)
, and con-
cave on
(
k, 1
)
for some k, k such that 0 < k < k < 1. Then the op-
timal censorship strategy is either (i) S = [0, q]; or (ii) S = [p, 1]; or (iii)
S = [0, q] ∪ [p, 1]; where 0 < q ≤ p < 1.
In words, the optimal censorship strategy includes cutoﬀs p and q such
that the sender reveals all states in the [q, p] interval, and censors all states
below q and above p. The location of these cutoﬀs depends on the shapes
of F and G. In particular, there may be a corner solution in which either
p = 1 or q = 0 (this corresponds to, respectively, cases (i) and (ii) in the
proposition)13. It is also possible to have p = q  this implies that S = [0, 1],
and thus no states are revealed.
Figure 3 illustrates Proposition 6. Intuitively, depending on the shapes
of F and G, there are three possibilities. First, it is possible that tS < k.
13But note that Lemma 1 ensures that we cannot have both q = 0 and p = 1.
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Figure 3: Optimal censorship under bimodal (concave-convex-concave) G.
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Then all ω ∈ [0, k] lie below the line that is tangent to G at tS; hence, by
Proposition 1 these states are censored. The tangent line can then intersect
G at most twice. If it does intersect G twice, at states q and p, then all states
ω ∈ (q, p) are revealed, and the rest are censored (this is shown in Figure
3a). If the tangent line intersects G once, at some point q, then S = [0, q].
Finally, if it never intersects G, then S = [0, 1].
It is also possible to have tS > k. Then all ω ∈
[
k, 1
]
belong to S. For
the rest of the state space, the tangent line can intersect G at most twice. If
it does intersect G twice, at some states q and p, then all states ω ∈ (q, p)
are revealed, and the rest are censored (this is shown in Figure 3b). If the
tangent line intersects G once, then S = [p, 1] for some p; and if it never
intersects G, then S = [0, 1].
Finally, if tS ∈
[
k, k
]
, then the tangent line can intersect G at most once
on [0, k], and at most once on
[
k, 1
]
. If the tangent line intersects G on one
of these intervals only, then tS /∈ S, which is impossible. If the tangent line
does not intersect G, then S = ∅, which for bimodal G is ruled out by Lemma
1. Hence, the tangent line must intersect G at some point q ∈ [0, k], and at
some point p ∈ [k, 1]. Then S = [0, q] ∪ [p, 1] (this is shown in Figure 3c).
5 Conclusions
In many persuasion settings, the sender is restricted to censorship strategies:
she can either reveal a state of the world perfectly, or hide it. This paper has
examined optimal censorship in a linear setting with a privately informed
receiver. Its main contribution was in developing a simple optimisation ap-
proach, described in Proposition 1, to analysing optimal censorship.
The optimisation approach produces a condition for a censorship strategy
to be optimal. While this condition is only a necessary and not a suﬃcient
condition, the paper shows how it can be used to gain insights about optimal
censorship strategies in a number of situations.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. To prove the ﬁrst part, take a set S. Now take
a state w belonging to the interior of S and suppose that zS (w) < 0.
14
14If w is on the boundary of S, take instead another state w′ in the neighbourhood of w
that lies in the interior of S such that zS (w
′) < 0. Such a state must exist because zS (·)
is continuous.
14
Consider a deviation from S to Sˆ = S \ [w, r] for some r > w. Let L (w, r) ≡
v
(
Sˆ
)
−v (S). Then L (w, r) = G (tS\[w,r])µS\[w,r]+∫ rw G(ω)dF (ω)−G (tS)µS.
If r = w, then L (w, r) = 0. For S to be optimal, L (w, r) must be weakly
decreasing in r at r = w. Diﬀerentiating yields:
∂L (w, r)
∂r
= g
(
tS\[w,r]
) ∂tS\[w,r]
∂r
µS\[w,r] +G
(
tS\[w,r]
) ∂µS\[w,r]
∂r
+G (r) f (r)
Hence,
∂L (w, r)
∂r
∣∣∣∣
r=w
= g (tS)
∂tS\[w,r]
∂r
∣∣∣∣
r=w
µS +G (tS)
∂µS\[w,r]
∂r
∣∣∣∣
r=w
+G (w) f (w)
Note that
tS\[w,r] =
∫
ω∈S ωdF (ω)−
∫ r
w
ωdF (ω)∫
ω∈S dF (ω)−
∫ r
w
dF (ω)
=
∫
ω∈S ωdF (ω)−
∫ r
w
ωdF (ω)
µS\[w,r]
and thus
∂tS\[w,r]
∂r
∣∣∣∣
r=w
=
−µS\[w,r]rf (r) + tS\[w,r]µS\[w,r]f (r)
µ2S\[w,r]
∣∣∣∣
r=w
=
f (w)
µS
(tS − w)
Also,
µS\[w,r] =
∫
ω∈S
dF (ω)−
∫ r
w
dF (ω)
and thus
∂µS\[w,r]
∂r
∣∣∣∣
r=w
= −f (w)
Therefore,
∂L (w, r)
∂r
∣∣∣∣
r=w
= g (tS) f (w) (tS − w)−G (tS) f (w)+G(w)f(w) = −f (w) zS (w)
Since f is strictly positive everywhere, the derivative is strictly positive
when zS (w) < 0, so S is not optimal.
The second part is proved analogously. Suppose that zS (w) > 0 for
some w /∈ S. Now take some interval [w, r] such that [w, r] ∩ S = ∅, and
consider a deviation from S to Sˆ = S∪ [w, r]. If S is optimal, then L (w, r) =
v
(
Sˆ
)
− v (S) must be weakly decreasing at r = w. Diﬀerentiating yields
∂L (w, r)
∂r
∣∣∣∣
r=w
= f (w) zS (w) > 0
so again S is not optimal.
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Proof of Lemma 1. To show that full revelation is optimal when g is
increasing, suppose that S is nonempty. Then zS (ω) > 0 for all ω, so S is
not optimal. To prove the second part of the lemma, suppose that S = ∅,
and that G is not convex. Then G must be concave on some interval [p, q].
Consider a deviation to to S = [p, q]. The change in the sender's payoﬀ from
such deviation equals
v ([p, q])− v (∅) = µ[p,q] [G (EF [ω | ω ∈ [p, q]])− EF (G (ω) | ω ∈ [p, q])]
This is positive by Jensen's inequality, and hence S = ∅ is not optimal.
Proof of Proposition 2. Proposition 1 implies that at every pi for i ∈
{2, .., n}, G crosses the line is tangent to G at tS from above. Furthermore,
at every qi for i ∈ {1, .., n− 1}, G crosses the line is tangent to G at tS
from below (note that we exclude p1 and qn because there may be a corner
solution with p1 = 0 or qn = 1). Hence, g (pi) < g (tS) for all i ∈ {2, .., n};
and g (qi) > g (tS) for all i ∈ {1, .., n− 1}. Hence, for all i ∈ {2, .., n− 1}, we
have g (pi) < g (qi) and g (pi+1) < g (qi), with pi < qi < pi+1. Thus, g must
have a peak between pi and pi+1 for all i ∈ {2, .., n− 1}, which gives us n−2
peaks. In addition, since g (q1) > g (tS) > g (p2), there must be another peak
of g between 0 and p2. Hence, g must have at least n− 1 peaks.
Proof of Lemma 2. Since the optimal S is nonempty by Lemma 1, tS is
well-deﬁned. Suppose that tS ≤ k. Then, as g is increasing on [0, tS], we have
zS (ω) =
∫ tS
ω
[g (x)− g (tS)] dx < 0 for all ω < tS. Then if S is optimal, all
ω < tS do not belong to S. This cannot hold, as tS ≡ E [ω | ω ∈ S]. Hence,
at the optimum, tS > k.
Then zS (ω) > 0 for all ω ≥ k, so [k, 1] ⊆ S. Note that dzS(ω)dω = g (tS) −
g (ω). This is negative at ω = k, and since g is monotone increasing on [0, k],
dzS(ω)
dω
changes sign at most once on that interval. Hence, on that interval
there is at most one state at which zS crosses zero. If such a state p exists,
it is the lower boundary of S. Otherwise, zS (ω) ≥ 0 for all ω ∈ [0, k], so
S = [0, 1].
To show uniqueness, suppose on the contrary that there exist p and p˜
such that p˜ < p, and both [p, 1] and [p˜, 1] are optimal censorship strategies.
Then z[p˜,1] (p˜) ≥ 0, and z[p,1] (p) = 0, the latter because p > 0. Thus,
g
(
t[p,1]
)
=
G
(
t[p,1]
)−G (p)
t[p,1] − p
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The derivative of the left-hand side of this equation with respect to p
equals g′
(
t[p,1]
) dt[p,1]
dp
. This is negative, since g is decreasing at t[p,1]. The
derivative of the right-hand side equals[
t[p,1] − p
] [
g
(
t[p,1]
) dt[p,1]
dp
− g (p)
]
− [G (t[p,1])−G (p)] [dt[p,1]dp − 1][
t[p,1] − p
]2
=
g
(
t[p,1]
) dt[p,1]
dp
− g (p)
t[p,1] − p − g
(
t[p,1]
) dt[p,1]dp − 1
t[p,1] − p
=
g
(
t[p,1]
)− g (p)
t[p,1] − p
>0
where the inequality follows from the fact that t[p,1] > p and g
(
t[p,1]
)
> g (p)
(the latter is because the line that is tangent to G at t[p,1] crosses G from
below at p). Hence decreasing p increases the left-hand side while decreasing
the right-hand side. Thus,
g
(
t[p˜,1]
)
>
G
(
t[p˜,1]
)−G (p˜)
t[p˜,1] − p˜
which implies that z[p˜,1] (p˜) = G
(
t[p˜,1]
) − G (p˜) − (t[p˜,1] − p˜) g (t[p˜,1]) < 0, so
[p˜, 1] cannot be an optimal strategy.
Proof of Proposition 3. By Lemma 2, Gˆ must induce a censorship policy
Sˆ = [pˆ, 1] such that tSˆ > kˆ and pˆ < kˆ. If kˆ > tS, this implies that tSˆ > tS.
Hence, pˆ > p, so Sˆ ⊂ S. On the other hand, if kˆ < p, then pˆ < kˆ < p, so
S ⊂ Sˆ.
Proof of Proposition 4. By Lemma 2, G and Fˆ must induce a censorship
policy Sˆ = [pˆ, 1] such that EFˆ [ω | ω > pˆ] > k. Since EFˆ [ω | ω > p] < k, it
must be that pˆ > p, so Sˆ = [pˆ, 1] ⊂ S.
Proof of Proposition 5. Since the optimal S is nonempty by Lemma 1,
tS is well-deﬁned. If tS ≤ k, then, as g is increasing on [0, k], we have
zS (ω) =
∫ tS
ω
[g (x)− g (tS)] dx < 0
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for all ω < tS. Then for S to be optimal, all ω < tS must not belong to S,
which cannot hold. Similarly, if tS ≥ k, then, as g is increasing on
[
k, 1
]
, we
have zS (ω) < 0 for all ω > tS, which implies that S is not optimal. Hence,
tS ∈
(
k, k
)
. Then zS (ω) > 0 for all ω ∈
(
k, k
)
, hence
(
k, k
) ⊂ S.
Then dzS(ω)
dω
= g (tS) − g (ω) is negative at ω = k. Since g is monotone
increasing on [0, k], dzS(ω)
dω
changes sign at most once on that interval. Hence,
on that interval there is at most one state at which zS crosses zero. If such
a state p exists, it is the lower boundary of S. Otherwise, zS (ω) ≥ 0 for all
ω ∈ [0, k], so p = 0.
Similarly, dzS(ω)
dω
= g (tS)−g (ω) is positive at ω = k. Since g is monotone
increasing on
[
k, 1
]
, dzS(ω)
dω
changes sign at most once on that interval. Hence,
on that interval there is at most one state at which zS crosses zero. If such
a state q exists, it is the upper boundary of S. Otherwise, zS (ω) ≥ 0 for all
ω ∈ [k, 1], so q = 1.
Proof of Proposition 6. Since the optimal S is nonempty by Lemma 1,
tS is well-deﬁned. Take some S, and suppose it is optimal. There are three
possibilities: tS < k; tS > k; and tS ∈
[
k, k
]
.
If tS < k, then, as g is decreasing on [0, k], we have
zS (ω) =
∫ tS
ω
[g (x)− g (tS)] dx > 0
for all ω ≤ k. Hence, [0, k] ⊆ S. Note that dzS(ω)
dω
= g (tS)− g (ω) is positive
at ω = k, hence zS (ω) is increasing at k. Since g is increasing on
[
k, k
]
and
decreasing on
[
k, 1
]
, dzS(ω)
dω
changes sign at most twice on [k, 1]. Hence, on
that interval there are at most two states at which zS (ω) crosses zero. If
there are two such states, call them q and p, and then S = [0, q] ∪ [p, 1]. If
there is one such state, call it q, and then S = [0, q]. Finally, if there are no
such states, then S = [0, q] ∪ [p, 1] with q = p.
If tS > k, then, as g is decreasing on
[
k, 1
]
, we have zS (ω) > 0 for all
ω ≥ k. Hence, [k, 1] ⊆ S. Note that dzS(ω)
dω
= g (tS) − g (ω) is negative at
ω = k, hence zS (ω) is decreasing at k. Since g is decreasing on [0, k] and
increasing on
[
k, k
]
, dzS(ω)
dω
changes sign at most twice on
[
0, k
]
. Hence, on
that interval there are at most two states at which zS (ω) crosses zero. If
there are two such states, call them q and p, and then S = [0, q] ∪ [p, 1]. If
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there is one such state, call it p, and then S = [p, 1]. Finally, if there are no
such states, then S = [0, q] ∪ [p, 1] with q = p.
If tS ∈
[
k, k
]
, then, as g is increasing on
[
k, k
]
, we have zS (ω) < 0 for
all ω ∈ (k, k). Hence, the interval (k, k) does not belong to S. Note that
dzS(ω)
dω
= g (tS) − g (ω) is positive at ω = k, and increasing on [0, k]. Also,
dzS(ω)
dω
= g (tS)− g (ω) is negative at ω = k, and increasing on
[
k, 1
]
. Hence,
zS (ω) crosses zero at most once on the [0, k] interval, and at most once on
the
[
k, 1
]
interval. If zS (ω) does not cross zero anywhere, then S = ∅, which
cannot be the case by Lemma 1. If zS (ω) crosses zero on [0, k] but not on[
k, 1
]
, then S = [0, q] for some q ∈ [0, k]  but in this case tS < k, which is
a contradiction. Similarly, if zS (ω) crosses zero on
[
k, 1
]
but not on [0, k],
then S = [p, 1] for some p ∈ [k, 1]  but in this case tS > k, which is a
contradiction. Hence, zS (ω) crosses zero exactly once on [0, k], and exactly
once on
[
k, 1
]
. Hence, S = [0, q]∪ [p, 1] for some q ∈ (0, k) and p ∈ (k, 1).
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